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Résumé 
 
Cette étude propose l’analyse des déterminants des marges prix-coût pour les pays de l’OCDE entre 
1970 et 2003. L’objectif principal est de quantifier l’effet pro-concurrentiel du commerce international et 
de comprendre pourquoi, malgré l’ouverture commerciale croissante, les marges n’ont pas baissé en 
général. Une augmentation d’un point de pourcentage du taux de pénétration des importations est 
estimée entraîner une baisse d’environ 0,005 de la marge : en moyenne, les importations ont 
contribué à une baisse importante de 0,042 des marges. De plus, la dérégulation domestique du 
marché des produits a réduit les marges. Cependant, ces effets sont contrebalancés par l’impact des 
exportations, de la financiarisation de l’économie et de la désinflation. La participation syndicale 
semble liée négativement aux taux de marge. 
 
Mots clés : Marges prix-coût, Effet pro-concurrentiel, Négociations salariales, Panel dynamique   
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study analyzes the determinants of price-cost margins (PCMs) for OECD countries between 
1970-2003. The main objective is to quantify the pro-competitive effect of international trade and 
understand why, despite trade liberalization, PCMs have not fallen overall. An increase of one 
percentage point in the import penetration ratio is estimated to lower the PCM by around 0.005: on 
average, imports contributed to a large decrease of 0.042 in the PCM. In addition, domestic product 
market deregulation has reduced PCMs. However, these effects are countervailed by the impacts of 
exports, financial deepening and disinflation. Union participation seems negatively related to PCMs.  
 
 
Keywords: Price-cost margin, Pro-competitive effect, Wage bargaining, Dynamic panel 
JEL Classification: F12, F16, L11, L13, L60, J50 
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1. Introduction  
 
Classical trade theory teaches that international trade reduces markups through the so-called pro-
competitive effect. The price-elasticity of demand perceived by domestic firms increases with foreign 
competition, which gives them an incentive to cut their margin. However, this theoretical effect does 
not square with the raw data. Figure 1 plots the price-cost margin (PCM) and the import penetration 
ratio at aggregated manufacturing level for seventeen OECD countries from 1970: at first sight, trade 
developments do not seem to have the expected effect on PCMs.1 Indeed, the negative correlation 
between the two series is apparent for Japan and Spain only. Does this mean that the pro-competitive 
effect does not materialize or that there are counterbalancing phenomena? 
 
In October 2003, the European Commission (2003) conducted a survey of 7 515 people in the 15 EU 
member states on the perception of globalization. Although 63% of the respondents were in favor of 
globalization, the answers revealed that conflicts of interests are prevalent and that the worker-
consumers do not perceive to benefit fully from the deeper integration of economies. Indeed, the 
majority would like to see the changes listed in Table 1: an increased influence of trade unions and 
consumer associations and a diminishing role of multinationals and financial circles. Obviously, this 
survey catches perceptions only, and perceptions need not reflect reality. However, following Paul 
Krugman’s first “commandment” (http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~pkrugman/howiwork.html) to listen to 
the Gentiles, one might at least wonder whether these dissatisfactions are related to the PCM puzzle. 
 
In fact, most empirical studies supporting the import-as-market discipline assumption focus on 
developing countries experimenting trade liberalization. Roberts and Tybout (1996) provides an 
extensive survey, which is enriched by recent papers including Krishna and Mitra (1998) for India and 
Pavcnik (2002) for Chile. Two exceptions are Kee and Hoekman (2003, hereafter KH) and Chen, Imbs 
and Scott (2004, hereafter CIS).   
 
KH investigate the impact of imports and competition law on industry markups using the UNIDO 
database and Hall’s (1988) methodology. They estimated that an increase of 10% in the ratio of 
imports to production would lower the markup by around 0.014.  However, their approach raises three 
                                                 
1 The definition of the variables is given in Section 3. 
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issues. First, the dependent variable is the growth rate of real value added, and not that of real output, 
due to data limitations. Second, the UNIDO dat abase provides data in current dollars only, while Hall-
type estimates are extremely sensitive to the price indices used to compute real variables. Third, KH 
infer theoretically a non-linear relationship between markup and the ratio of imports to production, m. 
However, they treat this non-linearity by estimating a specification in which the markup depends 
linearly on the logarithm of m.  There is no way that a doubling of the import ratio from 0.1% to 0.2% 
will have the same impact as a doubling from 10% to 20% for instance (their econometric specification  
implies that m/constantmmarkup =¶¶ /  and, therefore, that the derivative of the markup with respect 
to the import ratio is infinite when the import ratio approaches zero, which is inconsistent with their 
model and with all the generalizations I could think of. In fact from their model, it can be shown that 
0/lim
0
=¶¶
®
Logmmarkup
m
).  
 
Unfortunately, this choice is not innocuous. Running the fixed-effect estimator on the UNIDO database 
limited to OECD countries with the PCM, defined below, as the dependent variable leads to the 
following inferences. Although the logarithm of m was significant and of the same magnitude as found 
by KH, m or other less extreme non-linear functions tested were not. Going further into details, 
the )(mLog parameter is divided by 4 when the 41 highest markup observations out of a total of 7 082 
are excluded, 39 of them come from the tobacco industry in Austria, Korea and Norway where 
markups were between 300% and 630% and import penetration of less than 0.1% in five cases, not to 
mention their negligible output weight.2 In other words, the )(mLog specification gives far too much 
weight on “small m – high markups” observations, which distorts the estimates.    
 
CIS is a very stimulating paper attempting to assess the impact of imports on sectoral prices, 
disentangling the effects on productivity and markup. The key source of their data is Eurostat, but they 
also use for markups a fairly small sample of 418 observations from the BACH database. As CIS use 
the logarithm of the import ratio as their trade variable, the same limitation as for the KH study applies, 
especially as the import share ranges from 0.5% to 1291% in their sample. Nevertheless, they 
convincingly show that imports have a negative impact on sectoral prices and a positive one on 
                                                 
2 In addition, these particular series are inconsistent with the STAN database, probably because of high tax levels. 
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productivity in the long-run. Incidentally from their estimates, only a fourth, at most, of sectoral 
productivity gains are passed on in prices. Also and close to KH, a 10% increase in the ratio of imports 
would lower the markup by around 0.01. 
 
Recently, Broda and Weinstein (2004), using disaggregated data on imported products to the USA, 
found that the elasticity of substitution between varieties had decreased since 1972, from which they 
infer an increase in markups, consistent with Figure 1. Boulhol (2005), focusing on sectoral markup 
trends for OECD countries, finds no evidence of an average decrease in PCMs. More precisely, a 
strong pattern of convergence in PCMs, both across sectors and countries, is exhibited.3 This pattern 
results from a decrease in initially high PCMs and an increase in initially low PCMs. Better financial 
market efficiency might be a driving force in markup convergence, as it facilitates the conve rgence in 
the rates of return on equity across sectors and countries. Moreover, inspired by Blanchard (1997), the 
author suggested that the erosion of workers’ bargaining power would reconcile lower markups, not 
lower PCMs and decreasing manufacturing labor share.  
 
There is now extensive literature recognising that wages are partly determined by rent-sharing 
between capital holders and workers. Oliveira Martins (1994) insists on market structure to infer the 
impact of international trade on wages. Moreover, Borjas and Ramey (1995) establish both the 
presence of significant rents captured by workers and the negative impact of imports on wages in 
concentrated sectors, especially those of lower educated workers. More recently, Kramarz (2003) 
shows that outsourcing weakens the bargaining position of high-school graduate workers by limiting 
the availability of alternative jobs. Since competition affects rents, it is of critical importance to account 
for labor market imperfections, especially as labor market institutions have evolved substantially. On 
the theoretical front, Rodrik (1997) was probably the first to promote the idea that imports could lower 
workers’ bargaining position by making domestic and foreign labor more substitutable. More recently, 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) develop a model to capture the outcomes of product and labor market 
deregulations. They infer that the bargaining power of workers has most likely declined since the 
middle of the ‘eighties and show how product market deregulation may trigger labor market 
deregulation.  
                                                 
3 The convergence of PCMs is consistent with Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986) studying US firms between 1958-1981. 
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From another perspective, Sutton (1991, 1997) insists on the endogeneity of market structure, which 
entails a non-monotonic relation between the intensity of competition and the concentration ratio of 
certain types of industries, working through the exit of firms unable to keep the pace. Moreover, the 
impact of trade on market structure is central in the burgeoning literature on firm heterogeneity. 
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) highlight that imports induce the exit of the least efficient 
firms, leaving only the most productive higher-markup firms in the market. In Melitz (2003), export  
opportunities are driving the reshuffling of production at sector level.  
 
The objective of this study is to provide a better understanding of why, despite trade liberalization,  
PCMs, at OECD sector level, have not fallen in general. Following the discussion above, determinants 
of PCMs should include labor and financial market features. In addition, because firms may be slow to 
adjust their prices to factor cost pressure, inflation is likely to be negatively related to PCMs. Taking 
into account the cyclical behavior of markups, imports are shown to have a robust and strong negative 
effect on PCMs. On average for manufacturing across countries, the increase in imports is estimated 
to have reduced the PCM index by 0.04, from an average level of around 0.12. In addition, domestic 
product market deregulation has reinforced this trend towards lower markups. However, these pro-
competitive effects are counter-balanced by the positive impacts on the PCMs of increased exports, 
financial market development and disinflation. Moreover, union participation is negatively linked to 
PCM, consistent with its relation to workers’ bargaining position. On the other hand, employment 
protection seems positively related to PCM, probably because it raises non-wage costs, but this 
impact has low significance. Finally, because of the strong heterogeneity of labor market institutional 
changes between countries, the average effect of labor market trends across countries is not 
meaningful. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a model leading to the expression of the 
PCM with fairly general assumptions: differentiated goods, firm heterogeneity, foreign competition, 
conjectural variations and imperfect labor market. Section 3 focuses on the econometric specification 
and results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.    
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2. Model 
 
2.1 Perfect labor market 
The economy of a given country is composed of J sectors. The utility of the representative agent is 
CES of elasticity s and depends on the consumption jC  of the differentiated good j for j = 1, 2,…,J, 
according to: 
0,.
)1/(
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÷
ø
ö
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ss                                                                                      (1) 
Each variety l of good j is produced by one firm only, and js  is the constant elasticity of substitution 
between varieties: 
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For each variety, the production function is assumed to be homogenous of degree jr  in the variable 
factors: labor N, of price w, and other variable inputs I  of price q.4 Taking factor prices as given, the 
domestic firm l of sector j maximizes its profit by setting its price jlp  as a markup jlm  over its 
marginal cost, and produces jlY . First-order conditions and Euler’s equation leads to the markup 
equation:  
)(././ jljljjljljjljljl qIwNrVARCOSTrYp +== mm                                                                  (3) 
where VARCOST is the variable cost. The PCM, defined as Schmalensee (1989, p.960) reminds us as 
the difference between revenue and variable cost over revenue, is then derived:  
jl
j
jljl
jljljljl
jl
r
Yp
qIwNYp
PCM
m
-=
+-
º 1
)(
                                                                                    (4) 
The aggregated PCM at the sector level is obtained by weighting each firm l   PCM by its share jlx  in 
sector j domestic output. Appendix 1 establishes that: 
)1(.. jjj
firmsdomesticl
jljlj rLrPCMxPCM -+=º å
Î
                                                                              (5) 
   where the “aggregated Lerner index” jL  is given by: 
                                                 
4 I  and q  can be seen as vectors.  
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jq  being the import ratio of sector j defined as the ratio of imports over the sum of imports and 
domestic production, jH the Herfindahl index for domestic production and jg  an aggregated indicator 
measuring the intensity of competition. More precisely jg  is a weighted average of the jlg , related to 
the conjectural variations jljk YY ¶¶ /  according to: 
÷
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Under constant returns to scale (CRS), equation (5) states that the PCM collapses into the Lerner 
index. To facilitate the interpretation of equation (6), consider two simplified cases. First, with Cournot 
competition,  jljk YY ¶¶ /  equals one if lk = and zero otherwise. Then, both jlg  and jg  equals one. 
Second, in the case of identical firms either in autarchy or in the integrated equilibrium, jlg  becomes   
jjljjl gYYg =¶¶= /  where jY  is the total available production, domestic plus imports, of sector j. In 
this case, jg  ranges from 0 if competition is Bertand to 1 if Cournot.  
 
Moreover, equation (6) generalizes two well-known cases with identical firms. The first is Cournot 
competition ( 1=jg ) for a homogenous good ( ¥=js ): )./()1( sq NL jj -=  where N is the number of 
domestic firms. The second is Dixit-Stiglitz case of monopolistic competition ( 0=jH ): jjL s/1= . 
More generally, the more substitutable the goods, the fiercer the competition, the less concentrated 
domestic production or the greater the import penetration, the lower the PCM is. The pro-competitive 
effect of international trade can be measured by the sensitivity of the PCM to the import ratio: 
jjjjjj HgrPCM .)./1/1(./ ssq --=¶¶                                                                                     (9a) 
Table 2 gives some order of magnitude for reasonable values of the parameters, with a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function and CRS. For example, with an elasticity of substitution between varieties of 8, Cournot 
competition and a Herfindahl index of 0.2, an increase in the import ratio of 0.1 induces a decrease of 
0.018 in the Lerner index.  
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Of course, equation (9a) only holds if the concentration level, H, is constant. The work by Sutton 
(1991, 1997) insists on the endogeneity of market structure. An increase in the competitive 
environment may trigger an endogenous reaction of firms, through an increase in R&D or 
advertisement spending for instance, which forces out the firms unable to keep the pace. Also, but not 
necessarily related, the merger and acquisition wave of the ‘nineties gives an example of an 
endogenous reaction of firms aiming at improving their market power. Also, if imports generate a 
reshuffle of domestic production, as in Bernard et al., leading to the exit of the least efficient firms, 
which are likely to be the smallest, the Herfindahl index will increase as a result, and the pro-
competitive effect will be dampened:    
            ]/).1(.[)./1/1(./ jjjjjjjjj HHgrPCM qqssq ¶¶----=¶¶                                                  (9b) 
 
2.2 Wage bargaining 
Introducing labor market imperfections modifies the relationship between PCM and markup. There are 
usually two main ways to model wage bargaining, right-to-manage and efficient bargaining. Under the 
right-to-manage model, the firm and workers bargain over wages first and, in a second step, the firm 
decides on employment levels. In this case, wages remain allocative: wages are settled before 
employment decisions and therefore profit maximization first order conditions are left unchanged. 
Consequently, the markup equation remains given by equation (3).  
 
In the efficient bargaining model however, as firm and workers bargain over both wages and 
employment simultaneously, wages differ from the marginal revenue of labor. Crépon, Desplatz and 
Mairesse (2002) and Dobbelaere (2004), among others, give empirical support in favor of the efficient 
against the right-to-manage model. Appendix 2 proves that in this case, omitting the subscripts, the 
markup equation and the PCM becomes respectively: 
).(
)1/.(1
/
qIwN
r
r
pY +
-+
=
mg
m
                                                                                                (10) 
÷÷ø
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ççè
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PCM 1).1(
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                                                                                    (11) 
where g  is the bargaining power of workers. One can easily interpret these equations. The PCM is 
seen from the point of view of the firm paying the wage w, which includes the rents kept by workers. It 
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refers therefore to the share kept by the firm, hence the term )1( g- .5 Equation (11) reveals that the 
changes in the PCM over time are determined by changes in both the markup and the bargaining 
power. Indeed, by differentiating it, one gets: 
 g
mm
m
m
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ö
ççè
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D
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PCM                                                                                          (12) 
Correcting equation (6) to take into account the bargaining power of workers and using equation (11) 
lead to the general expression of the PCM at sector level: 
)1).(1()1.(..
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remembering that jg  is a conjectural variation parameter. 
 
2.3 Price rigidities 
At the macroeconomic level, for the period under study, the oil price shocks have had major impacts 
on observed markups resulting in distortions of value-added sharing between factor shares and profits. 
Among numerous reasons are: unexpected price developments, wage indexation, price stickiness, 
adjustment costs, terms of trade effects. It is well known that for continental Europe, especially France 
and Italy, wage indexation during the two oil price shocks resulted in an increased labor share and a 
squeezing of corporate profits and markups. 
 
A price shock will impact markups if there are rigidities in the sense that prices are slow to adjust to 
changes in nominal marginal costs. To understand this better, assume that output price tp  for time t 
adjusts to the desired level *tp  according to ).1.(..)1(
*
1
*
tttttt ppppp pbbb -»Û+-= - , where b  is 
an indicator of the rigidities and tp  is the inflation rate. Because of price rigidities, the measured 
PCM differs from the desired level, *PCM , given by (5) or (13), is negatively related to inflation and 
more so, the slower the prices adjust: 
pbpb ).1.().1.(
)(
1
)( **
*
PCMPCM
Yp
qIwN
pY
qIwNpY
PCM --=+
+
-»
+-
º                               (14) 
                                                 
5 The straightforward implication is that when labor market imperfections are ignored, as is the case in most markup estimates, 
the degree of product market imperfection, as represented by markup over marginal cost, is under-estimated, and even more so 
the greater the bargaining power. 
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Studying eight OECD economies, Banerjee and Russell (2001) establish a negative long-run 
relationship between inflation and markup. The interested reader will find in this article detailed 
references, both theoretical and empirical, supporting this result.  
 
3. Empirical specification 
 
3.1 Sectoral and labor market data 
Manufacturing data at sector level is taken from the OECD STAN database. This unbalanced panel 
covers twenty-three sectors at two-digit level (ISIC Rev.3) for seventeen countries between 1970-
2003. The prime goal of this study is to assess the impact of international trade on PCMs. The PCM 
variable, defined by equation (4), is calculated assuming that the variable inputs are labor and 
materials. This corresponds exactly to the definition given by Schmalensee and is the standard 
approach followed, among others, by Domowitz et al. and in most of the studies surveyed by Tybout 
(2003).  
 
Tables 3a and 3b give the average level and the average change over the period in the PCM, for each 
country and sector respectively. Markup trends were the prime focus of Boulhol (2005). Here, we just 
underline that the average PCM over the sample is 0.116, that there is no average decrease in PCMs, 
but rather a strong heterogeneity of changes between both countries and sectors, as the standard 
deviation states.  
 
The variable IMPRATIO is the import penetration ratio q  defined in the preceding section. Exports 
might also have an impact on the PCM essentially through two different channels. First, firms naturally 
orientate their production to the higher PCM markets, hence a direct positive relationship between 
exports and PCMs. Second, the recent literature on firm heterogeneity, especially Melitz (2003), 
suggests that exports could force out the least efficient firms. To the extent that the surviving firms 
have higher than average markups, the reshuffling of production within sectors due to exports could 
lead to an increase in the PCM. The variable EXPRATIO is defined as the ratio of exports to the sum 
of domestic production and imports.        
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Labor markets have changed profoundly over the last thirty years and, as shown above, the workers’ 
bargaining power is an important determinant of PCM. Therefore, two labor market indicators are used 
from the Labour Market Institutions Database assembled by Nickell and Nunziata (2001): EP  is the 
employment protection legislation index scaled on a (0;2) range, and UDNET is net union density.6 
 
Hoekman, Kee and Olarreaga (2001) found that stock market capitalization has a significant positive 
impact on average industry markups. They consider that financial deepening reduces the cost of 
capital, thus increasing the overall profitability of the economy. Within the theoretical framework 
detailed above, another way through which financial deepening may impact on PCMs is by weakening 
the workers’ bargaining power. Sub-section 4.2. comes back on the channel through which financial 
deepening may influence PCMs. To take this effect into account, the logarithm of stock market 
capitalization as a share of GDP, LOGCAPIT, is included in the regressors.    
 
Finally, in order to control for price developments according to (14), the change in the GDP deflator, 
DEFL, is included in the regressors.      
 
3.2 Cyclicality of markups 
Because of its importance in the drawing up of macroeconomic policies, abundant literature deals with 
the cyclicality of markups, but whether markups are pro- or contra-cyclical remains unresolved. The 
cyclicality is mostly due to mismeasurement of factor services and, in order to control for cycles, two 
variables are introduced. At sector level and following Bils (1987), the de-trended annual change in the 
logarithm of employment, EMPCYC, is computed using a Hodrik-Prescott filter. At the country level, 
the output gap, GAP, from the OECD 2003 Economic Outlook, is used. 
 
3.3 Econometric specification 
The preceding discussion suggests a static specification of the form: 
),,,,,,,( EMPCYCGAPDEFLLOGCAPITUDNETEPEXPRATIOIMPRATIOfPCM =  
                                                 
6 The data for about half of the countries ends in 1995, and extends to 1998 for the rest. However, as highlighted by the most 
recent data available (OECD Employment Outlook, 2004, Chapter 2), employment protection legislation has not changed much 
between 1998 and 2003. 
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However, past PCM will likely show up as a determinant of current PCM. Consequently, a 
representation including a lagged dependent variable is preferable. The most common specification is 
the partial adjustment model, where i, j and t stand for country, sector and time respectively: 
 
ijtijijtititit
ititijtijtijtijt
ueEMPCYChGAPgDEFLfLOGCAPITe
UDNETdEPcEXPRATIObIMPRATIOaPCMPCM
++++++
++++= -
....
..... 1r
                      (15) 
where ije  is a (country x sector) effect, potentially correlated to RHS variables, and ijtu  is assumed to 
be an i.i.d. residual.  
 
The panel is composed of 6403 observations split among 298 (country x sector) couples. Within this 
setting, as is well known, the Least Squared Dummy Variables estimator (LSDV) is biased for finite 
time dimension of the panel. Therefore, to get rid of the effects, ije , transformation of the data is 
required. The most common transformation is first-differencing but, in this case, the first difference of 
the lag dependent variable should be instrumented due to the correlation with the residual first 
difference. To check the robustness of the estimates, the following estimators are computed. AHL is 
the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator using the second and third lags of PCM  in level as an 
instrument and by taking into account the MA(1) structure of the differenced residuals.7 Efficiency 
could be improved substantially by using a broader set of moment conditions. GMM is the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) one-step estimator using three lags as instruments in block diagonal form.8 
 
Another attractive transformation is orthogonal deviation. Arellano and Bover (1995) showed that the 
OLS estimate on the orthogonal transformation was the LSDV, and that the transformed residuals 
were i.i.d. under the above assumptions. AHL estimator on the orthogonal transformation is denoted 
AHL-ORTH. Reciprocally, GMM-ORTH is the 2SLS estimator on the orthogonal transformation using 
the same valid instruments as GMM. Specifications including further lags in the dependent and 
explanatory variables are also tested.  
                                                 
7This instrument ought to be preferred to the lag of the first-difference (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
8 Two-step GMM estimators using Windmeijer finite sample correction from Roodman (2003) were also computed, but the 
results are not reported as they are very close to one-step estimates. 
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3.4 Endogeneity of international trade 
As much as domestic exporters are attracted to high-markup foreign markets, the greater the domestic 
markup the more foreign firms might export to the domestic market. In other words, the export 
decisions of foreign firms create a positive relation between markup and imports, hence a classical 
simultaneity problem. Therefore, estimators that do not take into account the endogeneity of the import 
variable are likely to underestimate the pro-competitive effect.  
 
Along the same lines, high domestic markups could act as a disincentive for the export  decision of 
domestic firms. As a result, the positive relation between exports and markups, as discussed above,  
will be underestimated if the export variable is treated as exogenous. The first three lags of trade 
variables which are valid instruments will be used. More precisely, in the first-difference specification 
as an example, 32  , -- tt IMPRATIOIMPRATIO  and 4 -tIMPRATIO  will serve as instruments for 
)( 1-- tt IMPRATIOIMPRATIO   and similarly for EXPRATIO , in vector form or in block diagonal for AHL 
or GMM respectively.  
 
3.5 Omitted variable bias 
As was established in equation (6), PCM is negatively related to the domestic intensity of competition.  
As domestic product market deregulation has accompanied trade liberalization over the last decades, 
omitting variables reflecting the intensity of competition might bias the pro-competitive effect of 
international trade upwards.  
 
This issue will be addressed in three ways. First, the sensitivity of the estimates will be assessed by 
including the product market regulation index available for years 1978, 1982, 1988, 1993, 1998 
(Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud, 1999) and 2003 (Conway, Janod and Nicoletti, 2005). The PMR 
variable is constructed by linearly interpolating between those dates.9 The series is built on a 0-6 
scale. PMR ranges, for the 17 countries, from 4 (USA) to 6 (France) in 1978 and from 1.0 (Australia, 
                                                 
9  Conway et al. made some corrections to the previous series, however the changes are very limited as the authors explain,  
page 10. Moreover, the scaling differs from that of Nicoletti et al. For 1998 where a direct comparison is possible, the linear 
correlation coefficient between the two series is 89% for the 17 countries in our sample. The old series regression to the new 
one gives: OLD = 1.726.NEW – 0.540. This relation is used to derive the 2003 series, consistent with those of Nicoletti et al.    
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United Kingdom) to 2.7 (Italy) in 2003. Therefore, the changes clearly reflect a deregulation trend,  
mostly common to the countries in the sample. Secondly, trade variables lagged 3, 4 and 5 will be 
tested as instruments in case the second lag is correlated with residuals. Finally, the validity and the 
relevance of the instruments will be tested.     
 
 
4. Results 
 
The previous section has put forward two important issues for the empirical analysis, the dynamic 
nature of the specification and the endogeneity issue of trade variables. These are now dealt with in 
turn to separate their specific impact. 
 
4.1 Persistence of the dependent variable 
Table 4 provides the estimates when trade is treated as exogenous. The main focus here is on the 
lagged dependent parameter r . The LSDV estimates, in the first column, is known to be biased even 
if the cross-section dimension - 298 in our case - becomes very large, but the bias here might not be 
too severe as the average time period is slightly above 21 observations.10 Even with this caveat, LSDV 
points to strong persistence with an estimate of 71.0=r . This is confirmed by AHL-ORTH and GMM-
ORTH, which give higher estimates, although not significantly different. One may infer that, given the 
size of the panel, the biased coming from its dynamic characteristic is not too serious.  
 
Note the gain in efficiency between these estimates based on orthogonal deviation and first-difference 
estimators, AHL and GMM. This is particularly striking between both Andersion-Hsiao estimators, 
based on the second and third lags only. Arellano and Bover (1995, p.40) showed that estimators do 
not depend on which transformation is used, provided that the instruments are block diagonal and that 
the instruments used for period t are maintained for subsequent periods. Neither of these conditions 
are met here because each exogenous variable is used for instrumenting as one vector, and because 
maintaining all lags would create far too many moments.  
 
                                                 
10 For the lag parameter, Judson and Owen (1999) estimate that the bias could be as high as 20% for T = 30. 
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Moreover and importantly, the rejection of the overidentifying restrictions from the Sargan-Hansen test, 
except for AHL, points to misspecifications, which essentially come from the endogeneity of trade, as 
shown below. Keeping this in mind, the imports parameter is significant whereas the exports one is 
not, and the long-term sensitivity of PCM to the import ratio ranges from -0.10 to -0.45.      
 
4.2 Treating trade as endogenous 
This subsection highlights the importance of accounting for the endogeneity of trade variables. The 
lagged dependent parameter is not too affected by the addition of trade instruments, as the results 
presented in Table 5a indicate. It ranges from 0.54 for AHL on first differences to 0.70 for AHL-ORTH.  
 
Validity of the specification 
The first test is the Sargan-Hansen test of overidenfying restrictions, which generally tends to over-
reject the validity of the instruments. However, a large number of weak instruments might lead to 
under-rejection (Sevestre, 2002). With only five excluded instruments, AHL estimators are almost 
immune to this risk.  Moreover, for the equation in first-difference, the GMM estimator using one lag 
only as instrument, GMMa, is reported in the second column, and the one with three lags, GMMb, in 
the third column. 
 
At the 5% level, and in contrast to the results in Table 4, the Sargan-Hansen test no longer rejects the 
validity of the instruments for the five estimators in Table 5. However, the probability falls to 0.07 for 
GMMa. Therefore, the good news is that the two AHL estimators seem reliable based on this test. On 
the other hand, the fact that GMMb does not reject the null with 185 additional restrictions compared to 
GMMa, which almost rejects it, puts the validity of the broader set of instruments into serious doubt.  
 
To investigate this issue further, statistics for the first-stage regressions are presented in Table 5b. 
Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) remind us that the presence of weak instruments biases the 
estimates towards OLS in finite samples. Consequently, BJB suggest that partial R-square and F-
statistic be reported routinely, to help diagnose weak instruments, and Stock and Yogo (2002) 
formalize what the notion of weak instrument means. More precisely, based on the number of 
excluded instruments, they compute the value of the F-statistic above which the bias of the IV estimate 
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is not greater than say 10% of the OLS bias, at a 5% significance level for instance. The rule of thumb 
of Staiger and Stock (1997) of 10 for the F-stat is therefore refined but still holds reasonably well. 
However, when there is more than one endogenous regressor, Shea (1997) warns that the F-stats are 
insufficient in case of strong correlation between the instruments. To detect the problems that might be 
generated by this type of correlation, the comparison between the standard partial R² (BJB, second 
column in table 5b) and Shea partial R² (first column), which takes the intercorrelations among the 
instruments into account, is useful. As indicated by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003), when these 
two measures are close to each other, then the correlation of the instruments is low enough, not to be 
a source for concern.  
 
Based on the upper panel of Table 5b, the limited set of instruments for the two AHL estimators  
display an F-stat far above the 10 threshold in both cases, even if the discrepancy between the two 
partial R² mitigates somehow the power of this test. Reading the table vertically from the upper to the 
lower part reveals that adding a large number of instruments, even though it increases the fit of the 
first-stage regressions, actually deteriorates the F-stat. From Stock and Yogo’s Table 1, one cannot 
reject the possibility that the bias of these GMM estimators be as much as 25% of the OLS bias (OLS 
estimates are reported in the first two columns of table 4). In other words, even if the GMM estimators 
seem to respect the orthogonality conditions, first stage statistics call into question the relevance of the 
broader set of instruments.  
     
For the equation in first differences, the two auto-correlation statistics (middle part of table 5a) validate 
the specification: strong first-order correlation that is dealt with by the Arellano-Bond estimator, no 
significant second-order correlation. For the orthogonal transformation equation, residuals are 
supposed to be i.i.d. This is only partially confirmed by the tests. Although the absence of first-order 
correlation is accepted, the m2 statistic detects second-order correlation. Sub-section 4.3 will show 
that this shortcoming is not present at usual significance level for other specifications giving similar 
results. 
  
In summary, the two AHL estimators are the more reliable. However this comes at the cost of less 
precise estimates. The three GMM estimates might rely on less relevant instruments but, as will be 
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shown now, the five estimators lead to close estimates, except for the labor market parameters. Let us 
now turn to the long term impact of the explanatory variables. 
 
Cycles 
Cycle effects are very significant and robust across the different estimators. PCM is found to be pro-
cyclical at sector level, as a rise of 1% of cyclical employment induces a decrease of between 0.001 
and 0.002 in the PCM. On the other hand, PCM appear to react positively to the whole country cycle: 
an increase of 1% of GDP in the output gap entails a decrease of 0.002 / 0.003 in the PCM. These 
results are consistent with those of Boulhol (2005), obtained from a different methodology, and similar 
in magnitude. As suggested in this related study, there may be a supply-driven counter-cyclical partial 
equilibrium effect, consistent with most empirical findings (Bils, 1987, Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999,  
Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta, 2002, among others) dampened by a pro-cyclical general equilibrium 
one, consistent with the pro-cyclicality of total profits.  
 
Prices 
As expected, inflation tends to reduce PCM. The parameter on the change of the GDP deflator is 
highly significant and robust across estimators. A value of around -0.20 means that b  from subsection 
2.3 is around 0.23 on average, and indicates that a decrease of 1% in the GDP deflator triggers an 
increase of 0.002 in the steady-state PCM.  
 
International trade 
Import penetration is significant at 1% for all the specifications. As expected from the discussion in 
Section 3, comparison of Tables 4 and 5 confirms that treating trade as exogenous leads to a strong 
underestimation of its effect on PCM. Depending on the estimator, the IMPRATIO long-term parameter 
ranges from -0.43 to -0.75. Consistently with the preceding discussion, adding more instruments tend 
to lower the impact, driving the estimates towards OLS. An increase of one percentage point in the 
import penetration ratio lowers the PCM by around 0.005 on average.  
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Export intensity has a positive effect on PCM, although the EXPRATIO variable is not always 
significant. In magnitude, the effect from exports is around a third in the opposite direction of the one 
found for the pro-competitive effect of imports. 
 
Stock market capitalization 
The market capitalization variable, LOGCAPIT, is significant at the 5% level for most of the estimators. 
A doubling of the capitalization is associated with an increase of around 0.005 in the PCM. This is 
consistent with the findings by Hoekman et al. (2001). According to them, the channel of this financial 
deepening effect is a lowering of the cost of capital, which increases overall profitability. It is not very 
clear, however, why this decrease in factor cost will not be passed on to customers, except of course if 
market power increases. Moreover, if capital is fixed, a decrease in the user cost does increase 
profitability, but this will not show up in the PCM  computed without taking into account capital costs.11 
Another possible channel could link financial market development to the weakening of workers’ 
bargaining position, through increased capital mobility.      
 
Labor market 
The two labor market indicators are not significant in the first-difference specification, but are in the 
orthogonal deviation one. Orthogonal deviations might capture long-term effects better, especially 
when there is strong inertia in the data, as is the case with the employment protection variable, EP. In 
line with its link to workers bargaining power, a decrease in union density leads to an increase in PCM. 
When significant, a decrease of 1 percentage point in union coverage entails an increase of 0.0013 in 
the PCM.   
 
Moreover, the EP parameter does not have the a priori – at least mine – expected sign. An increase in 
employment protection is associated with higher PCM. Dobbelaere (2004) finds, from a study of 
Belgian firms, that higher bargaining power is associated with higher markups. Indeed, wages do not 
capture all the employment cost and, in particular, more protection may increase firing costs. However, 
                                                 
11 Another tempting explanation, especially for the nineties ’, links M&A activities with both the rise in stock prices and the 
increase in market power. This is clearly a mechanism linking markups and market capitalization positively. However, we focus 
here on the impact of total capitalization on sectoral PCMs. Moreover, if this were the operating channel, treating market 
capitalization as endogenous would probably leads to higher estimates, which is not the case as mentioned below. 
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it is uncertain what the overall effect on the PCM is. From Section 3, we infer that there would be two 
conflicting effects of employment protection on the PCM, one direct and negative through bargaining 
power, and the other indirect and positive through markup. Employment protection could be positively 
linked to the PCM, if it reflects non-wage costs rather than bargaining power.  
 
Product market deregulation 
Another possibility is that the EP captures the effect of an omitted correlated variable, like product 
market regulation. Therefore, estimates are run by adding the PMR variable and, Table 6 reports the 
results, repeating therein the third and fifth columns from Table 5a to facilitate comparison. As 
expected from the theoretical model, product market deregulation reduces PCMs and is moreover 
significant at the 5% level. A one point drop in the PMR index induces a decrease of around 0.008 in 
the PCM. Furthermore, adding the PMR variable has three main effects. Firstly, the pro-competitive 
effect of imports is slightly reduced in both specifications, albeit not significantly. This is not surprising 
since the PMR index includes both inward- and outward-oriented policy features. More specifically, 
tariffs have a weight of 9% in the construction of the overall index (Conway et al., Fig.1). Secondly, the 
impact of the EP variable is diminished and becomes insignificant even in the orthogonal deviation 
case. Finally, both the impact of the financial market development and its significance are increased.   
 
4.3 Other robustness checks 
The second to fourth lags of trade variables were included above in the instruments. This passed the 
overidentification test successfully. To further strengthen this result, estimates were computed by 
replacing the second lag by the fifth, keeping the third and fourth. Table 7 reports the results for the 
two transformations of the data. They are indeed very close to their respective counterpart presented 
in the third and fifth columns of Table 5a. 
 
Although the partial adjustment specification is common, it is also restrictive. A more complete 
autoregressive distributed lag model was tested, by including the second lag of the dependent and the 
first lag of trade variables as explanatory variables. To save space, the results are not presented here.  
The precision is much poorer than for the partial adjustment model, probably because of 
multicollinearity. In addition, long-term sensitivities are very comparable, except for trade and country 
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cycle parameters, which are roughly halved. All in all, compared to the partial adjustment, this more 
complete model does not add valuable information and loses in precision. As for the results in Table 7,  
the assumption of no second-order correlation is accepted even for the orthogonal deviation case.  
 
Despite the fact that labor market indicators, market capitalization and inflation are taken at country 
level, the endogeneity of these variables might still be problematic. Second and third lags were used 
as instruments, which passed the Sargan-Hansen test. Also, the results were extremely close to the 
one obtained when treating these explanatory variables as exogenous.  
 
4.4 Are these numbers large? 
The Table below broadly summarizes our results.  
 Long-term sensitivity  
of the price-cost margin 
 
Significance 
Imports -0.7 / -0.4 High 
Exports 0.15 Medium / Low  
Employment Protection 0 / 0.04 Low  
Union Density -0.15 / 0 Medium 
Product Market Regulation 0.008 Medium 
Market Capitalization  0.01 Medium 
Inflation -0.2 High 
Country Cycle 0.2 / 0.3 High 
Sector Cycle -0.2 / -0.1 High 
 
Are these numbers large? For the pro-competitive effect of imports, a centre estimate of -0.5 is as 
large as it could be. Indeed, given the simulations presented in Table 2, it is consistent only with high-
differentiated goods, high concentration and fairly weak domestic competition.  
 
However and more generally, the quantitative effects detailed in Subsection 4.2 might seem low. This 
impression is misleading in the retrospective of the tremendous changes OECD economies have gone 
through, from the seventies. Table 8 indicates, in the upper part, the changes over the period of the 
non-cyclical variables for each country, using trade at the whole manufacturing level for illustration 
purposes. For instance, on average across countries, stock market capitalization as a percentage of 
GDP has been multiplied by six, and inflation has receded by five percentage points. The comparison 
of the average change and the average absolute change illustrates that the trends are mostly common 
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to OECD countries, except for the labor market evolutions. Indeed, there is no average change in 
union density, whereas the absolute change is 12 percentage points on average. 
 
The lower part of the table applies the GMM1-ORTH estimates of Table 6 to these changes, in order 
to give some order of magnitude of the impacts on the PCM. Four main lessons can be drawn. First, 
the average effect across countries of the increase in imports is to reduce the PCM by 0.042. This is 
very large indeed, given that the average PCM is around 0.12. Second, measures taken to deregulate 
domestic product markets are estimated to contribute further to the lowering of PCMs, as the average 
impact from the PMR variable is -0.017. Third, these pro-competitive effects are countervailed by the 
combination of increased exports, financial market development and disinflation, which overall impacts 
are 0.021, 0.021 and 0.010 respectively. Fourth, the average absolute effect due to the joint labor 
market variables is 0.021, 0.018 coming from the changes in the union participation. This is also large,  
even though the situation is very heterogeneous between countries.     
 
Finally, although the methodologies differ, the estimate of the pro-competitive effect of imports is 
similar to that found by KH and CIS, discussed in the Introduction. Indeed, these two studies estimate 
that the sensitivity of the markup to the logarithm of the ratio of imports to production, )1/( qq -=m , is 
around 0.1. From 
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 , we infer with constant return 
to scale and average values, 1.1=m  and 3.0=q , that KH and CIS estimates are consistent with a 
sensitivity of the PCM to the import ratio q  of -0.39, very close to our centre estimates. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study analyses the determinants of price-cost margins at sector manufacturing level for OECD 
countries between 1970 and 2003. An increase of one percentage point in the import penetration ratio 
is estimated to lower the PCM by around 0.005. This is a large effect, as it means that, on average 
across countries and for the whole manufacturing industries, imports contributed to a decrease of 
0.042 in the PCM over the period, from an average level of around 0.12. In addition, domestic product 
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market deregulation has lowered the PCMs. However, these pro-competitive effects are countervailed 
by the impacts of exports, financial market development and disinflation. 
 
Despite the promising avenues it opens, the burgeoning theoretical literature on firm heterogeneity has 
not yet unveiled the channel through which exports might increase PCMs. Indeed, in Bernard et al.  
imports drive the reshuffle and in Melitz (2003), exports influence market structure but with constant 
markups.  
 
The positive impact of financial deepening on markups was pointed out by Hoekman et al. (2001). The 
explanation they propose through lower cost of capital is not very convincing, as discussed earlier.  
One suggestion links financial market development, capital mobility and the weakening of workers’ 
bargaining power. Understanding better the mechanisms through which financial deepening impacts 
PCMs is a promising direction for further research.     
 
Moreover, deunionization is estimated to be negatively related to PCM, as a decrease of ten 
percentage points in union participation might trigger an increase of around 0.016 in the PCM. 
However, because of the strong heterogeneity of labor market institutional changes between 
countries, the average effect of labor market trends across countries is not meaningful. 
 
These results put the textbook version of the pro-competitive effect into the perspective of the 
important macro-economic trends OECD economies have gone through. They obviously have 
important consequences for the analysis of welfare and the distribution impacts of globalization. 
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Appendix 1: Expression of the Price-Cost Margin in the case of a differentiated good, 
heterogeneous firms and conjectural variations 
 
Maximization of utility by the representative agent can classically be achieved in two steps. For a given 
good j, consumptions of two varieties k and l are related according to: 
j
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which leads to the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz expression for any variety l: 
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where R  is total revenue and ( ) )1/(11.)( sss --å= jj PapG  is the general price index. Using equation 
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Using market clearing conditions: kYC jkjk "= , this equation implicitly gives the demand faced by 
firm l in function of its price and the production of the other varieties of the same good. Differentiating 
this expression with respect to jlY , at constant revenue and by ignoring the impact on the overall 
manufacturing price index, leads to: 
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Using again equation (A1) at equilibrium and rearranging gives: 
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where jlx  is the share of firm l in sector j domestic output and jq  is the import penetration ratio of 
sector j defined as the ratio of imports over the sum of imports and domestic production. Classically, 
profit maximization for a firm producing the variety l of good j gives the expression linking the markup 
to jle , the price-elasticity of the demand faced by the firm: 
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 Aggregating the PCMs at the domestic sector level leads to the expressions in equations (5) to (8).  
 
 
Appendix 2: Efficient bargaining 
With g  being the bargaining power of workers and uw  the reservation wage, the objective function 
being maximised in the Nash-bargaining process is classically: 
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Table 1: Extract from Question 10 of European Commission (2003) 
 
Q10: For each of the following actors, tell me if 
 it has/ they have … on the process of globalisation. 
 
 
 Too much influence Just the right level of 
influence 
 
Not enough influence DK&NA 
Trade unions 15% 23% 55% 6% 
Financial circles 59% 23% 11% 7% 
Consumer associations 8% 22% 66% 5% 
Multinationals 62% 21% 11% 5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Sensitivity of the pro-competitive effect 
 to intensity of competition (g), concentration (H),  
elasticity of substitution between varieties ( )js .* 
 
jjjjjj HgrPCM .)./1/1.(/ ssq --=¶¶  
(simulation with 1=s  and 1=jr ) 
 
  2=js  8=js  
  Herfindahl index   H Herfindahl index   H 
  
0.1 
 
0.2 
 
0.5 
 
0.1 
 
0.2 
 
0.5 
 
0.1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
0.5 -0.03 -0.05 -0.13 -0.04 -0.09 -0.22 
Conjectural 
variation  
g 1 -0.05 -0.10 -0.25 -0.09 -0.18 -0.44 
 
Denotations: PCM  is the price-cost margin, q  the import ratio, r  the returns to scale, s the elasticity of substitution 
between different goods. 
 
 
(*) reading: When competition is Cournot ( 1=g ), the Herfindahl index is 0.2 and the elasticity of substitution between varieties 
is 8, an increase of 1 percentage point in the import penetration ratio reduces the PCM by 0.0018. 
 
 
Note that these numbers are calculated under perfect labor market. From equation (11), with a bargaining power say of 0.2, 
these shall be multiplied by 0.8.  
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Table 3a: Average level and average change in the Price-Cost Margin 
across sectors over the period (unweighted) * 
 
 Level Change 
 
Average 
 
Standard-
deviation 
 
Average 
 
Standard-
deviation 
 
Australia 0.131 0.051 0.026 0.052 
Austria 0.123 0.031 0.070 0.085 
Belgium 0.107 0.031 0.001 0.025 
Canada 0.120 0.041 0.069 0.031 
Denmark 0.103 0.033 0.016 0.068 
Spain 0.133 0.052 -0.091 0.108 
Finland 0.130 0.037 -0.002 0.073 
France 0.106 0.035 0.030 0.105 
UK 0.106 0.026 0.014 0.065 
Germany 0.095 0.037 -0.011 0.047 
Italy 0.140 0.049 -0.029 0.053 
Japan 0.149 0.045 -0.008 0.070 
Netherlands 0.107 0.036 -0.002 0.070 
Norway  0.089 0.023 -0.011 0.070 
New Zealand 0.148 0.033 0.012 0.041 
Sweden 0.098 0.071 0.042 0.065 
USA 0.111 0.048 0.023 0.063 
     
Total 0.116 0.044 0.007 0.079 
 
 
(*) : For the level, the standard deviation is the standard deviation across sectors of the average PCM through time. The change 
refers for a given (country x sector) to the change in the PCM between the beginning and the end of the period 
 
 
 
 
Table 3b: Average level and average change  in the Price-Cost Margin  
across countries over the period (unweighted) *  
 
 Level Change 
 
Average 
 
Standard-
deviation 
 
Average 
 
Standard-
deviation 
 
Food and Beverages  0.106 0.021 0.024 0.025 
Textiles 0.111 0.028 0.022 0.071 
Wearing Apparel 0.110 0.022 0.008 0.057 
Leather and Footwear 0.098 0.030 0.034 0.069 
Wood and Cork 0.123 0.039 -0.015 0.065 
Pulp and Paper 0.137 0.029 0.030 0.060 
Printing and Publishing 0.134 0.036 0.028 0.059 
Coke, Refined Petroleum 0.113 0.078 0.001 0.176 
Chemical 0.161 0.036 0.029 0.049 
Rubber and Plastics 0.123 0.023 0.011 0.057 
Other non-metallic mineral 0.155 0.035 -0.010 0.060 
Basic metals 0.095 0.024 0.010 0.074 
Fabricated Metal 0.120 0.024 0.007 0.047 
Machinery and Equipment, 0.108 0.024 -0.025 0.064 
Office, Accounting and Comp. Mach. 0.117 0.047 -0.087 0.097 
Electrical Machinery 0.119 0.022 -0.045 0.078 
Radio, TV and Comm. Equip. 0.119 0.058 0.006 0.113 
Medical, Precision and Optical 0.120 0.049 0.025 0.066 
Motor Vehicles 0.080 0.024 0.027 0.063 
Other Transport 0.063 0.047 0.066 0.067 
Manuf. Nec and Recycling 0.113 0.057 -0.002 0.056 
     
Total 0.116 0.044 0.007 0.079 
 
 
(*) : For the level, the standard deviation is the standard deviation across countries of the average PCM through time. The 
change refers for a given (country x sector) to the change in the PCM between the beginning and the end of the period 
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Table 4: Determinants of the Price-Cost Margin when 
trade variables are treated as exogenous 
  
 LSDV 
DIFF-
MA(1) AHL GMM 
AHL-
ORTH 
GMM-
ORTH 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
Lag (PCM) 0.708*** 0.785*** 0.539*** 0.465*** 0.730*** 0.746*** 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.168) (0.112) (0.059) (0.041) 
       
Import ratio -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.207*** -0.211*** -0.027** -0.028*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.050) (0.044) (0.011) (0.010) 
       
Export ratio 0.006 -0.014** -0.013 -0.021 0.008 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.028) (0.025) (0.011) (0.010) 
       
Employment  0.0071* 0.0062*** -0.0059 0.0108 0.0071 0.0071 
Protection (0.0037) (0.0020) (0.0080) (0.0089) (0.0052) (0.0046) 
       
Union Density -0.032*** -0.013* 0.020 0.002 -0.029* -0.028* 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.046) (0.042) (0.017) (0.015) 
       
Market  0.0005 0.0041*** 0.0040* 0.0037** 0.0000 0.0003 
Capitalization (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
       
Inflation -0.050*** -0.008 -0.063*** -0.093*** -0.051*** -0.050*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.024) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) 
       
Output gap 0.026 0.040** 0.115*** 0.121*** 0.021 0.022 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.045) (0.039) (0.022) (0.019) 
       
Sector cycle -0.046*** -0.060*** -0.036** -0.040*** -0.045*** -0.047*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) 
       
Sargan-Hansen 
test 
   
1.7 (1) 
0.19 
 
135.9 (92) 
0.002 
 
7.6 (1) 
0.006 
 
139.9 (92) 
0.001 
 
m1   -6.7 (0.00) -7.03 (0.00) -2.46 (0.01) -2.13 (0.03) 
m2     1.35 (0.18)   0.85 (0.40)   0.78 (0.44) 0.71 (0.48) 
       
Nb Obs 6403 6105 5807 6105 5807 6105 
       
 
Long-term sensitivity 
 
IMPRATIO -0.10 -0.15 -0.45 -0.39 -0.10 -0.11 
EXPRATIO 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.02 
EP 0.024 0.029 -0.013 0.020 0.027 0.028 
UDNET -0.11 -0.06 0.04 0.00 -0.11 -0.11 
LOGCAPIT 0.002 0.019 0.009 0.007 0.000 0.001 
DEFL -0.17 -0.04 -0.14 -0.17 -0.19 -0.20 
GAP 0.09 0.18 0.25 0.23 0.08 0.08 
EMPCYC -0.16 -0.28 -0.08 -0.08 -0.17 -0.19 
Notes. 
(i) The dependent variable is the PCM and the specification is the partial adjustment model of equation (15), with potentially 
correlated (sector x country) effects. LSDV is the fixed effect estimator and DIFF-MA(1) is the GLS estimator of the 
equation in first-differences  with MA(1) residuals. GMM is the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator, using as instruments the 
second to fourth lag of the dependent variable in block diagonal form. AHL and AHL-ORTH are the Anderson-Hsiao 
estimator with instrument in level for the equation in first differences and in orthogonal deviations, respectively. GMM1-
ORTH is the GMM estimator for the orthogonal specification using the same set of instruments as GMM.  
(ii) In this table, the lag of the dependent variable only is treated as endogenous. 
(iii) Asymptotic standard errors, between parentheses, are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and computed from 
Roodman (2003). *, ** and *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
(iv) For the Sargan-Hansen test, the J-statistic is reported. The number of excluded instruments is between parentheses, and 
the probability that the overidentifying restrictions are rejected is reported below . 
(v) m1 and m2 are Arellano-Bond tests for first- and second-order correlation. P-values are in parentheses . 
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Table 5a: Determinants of the Price-Cost Margin when 
trade is treated as endogenous 
 
 AHL GMMa GMMb 
AHL-
ORTH 
GMM-
ORTH 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
Lag (PCM) 0.536*** 0.552*** 0.565*** 0.699*** 0.694*** 
 (0.060) (0.075) (0.053) (0.055) (0.041) 
      
Import ratio -0.335*** -0.264*** -0.225*** -0.226*** -0.132*** 
 (0.147) (0.064) (0.047) (0.070) (0.031) 
      
Export ratio 0.096 0.100** 0.057 0.049 0.037 
 (0.111) (0.051) (0.039) (0.069) (0.030) 
      
Employment  -0.0011 0.0091* 0.0032 0.0127* 0.0109** 
Protection (0.0128) (0.0087) (0.0081) (0.0074) (0.0055) 
      
Union Density -0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.054** -0.042** 
 (0.038) (0.036) (0.032) (0.022) (0.018) 
      
Market  0.0046 0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0035** 0.0020* 
Capitalization (0.0031) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0012) 
      
Inflation -0.066** -0.094*** -0.078*** -0.076*** -0.064*** 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) 
      
Output gap 0.159*** 0.140*** 0.131*** 0.073* 0.061** 
 (0.061) (0.041) (0.038) (0.043) (0.026) 
      
Sector cycle -0.042** -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.068*** -0.059*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) 
      
Sargan-Hansen 
test 
 
3.0 (5) 
0.70 
 
113.8 (91) 
0.07 
 
265.4 (276) 
0.67 
 
7.8 (5) 
0.17 
 
260.9 (276) 
0.73 
 
m1 -6.23 (0.00) -7.73 (0.00) -6.59 (0.00) 1.74 (0.08) 1.11 (0.27) 
m2 1.36 (0.18) 0.98 (0.33) 0.94 (0.35) 2.63 (0.01) 2.03 (0.04) 
      
Nb Obs 5509 6105 6105 5509 6105 
      
 
 
Long-term sensitivity 
 
IMPRATIO -0.72 -0.59 -0.52 -0.75 -0.43 
EXPRATIO 0.21 0.22 0.13 0.16 0.12 
EP -0.025 0.020 0.007 0.042 0.036 
UDNET -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.18 -0.14 
LOGCAPIT 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.007 
DEFL -0.14 -0.21 -0.18 -0.25 -0.21 
GAP 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.24 0.20 
EMPCYC -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.23 -0.19 
 
       Notes. 
(i) See notes to Table 4. 
(ii) In addition here, trade variables are treated as endogenous. Lags 2 to 4 of the import and export ratios are used as 
instruments in block diagonal form. This means, for example, that 432 ,, --- ttt qqq  serve as instruments in the first-
difference equation for )( 1-- tt qq  and in the orthogonal deviation equation for 
              ))1/()...(( 11 +-+++- +- tTTttt qqqq .  
(iii) Second-step estimates give similar results. 
(iv) Treating the other explanatory variables as endogenous leads to very comparable results. 
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Table 5b 
 
Relevance of the instruments 
 
First-stage regressions statistics 
 
 
 
 First-Difference Orthogonal Deviation 
 
Endogenous 
Variable 
Shea Partial R² 
of excluded 
instruments 
Partial R² 
of excluded 
instruments 
F statistic Shea Partial R² 
of excluded 
instruments 
Partial R²  
of excluded 
instruments 
 
F statistic 
 AHL – Column (1) in Table 5a 
 
AHL-ORTH  – Column (4) in Table 5a 
Lag (PCM) 0.066 0.067 12.7 0.185 0.195 52.0 
Import ratio 0.012 0.032 22.1 0.022 0.043 23.0 
Export ratio 0.010 0.028 14.5 0.035 0.070 26.3 
  
 
GMMa – Column (2) in Table 5a 
 
 
 
GMM-ORTH  – Column (5) in Table 5a 
Lag (PCM) 0.080 0.080 3.6 0.319 0.337 6.4 
Import ratio 0.062 0.073 5.3 0.129 0.152 4.2 
Export ratio 0.063 0.075 6.0 0.187 0.213 3.4 
  
 
GMMb – Column (3) in Table 5a 
 
Lag (PCM) 0.191 0.193 3.8 
Import ratio 0.155 0.157 5.2 
Export ratio 0.166 0.169 4.9 
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 Table 6: Determinants of the Price-Cost Margin 
 
including product market regulation 
 
 GMMb GMMb GMM-ORTH GMM-ORTH 
     
Lag (PCM) 0.565*** 0.557*** 0.694*** 0.696*** 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.041) (0.038) 
     
Import ratio -0.225*** -0.181*** -0.132*** -0.109*** 
 (0.047) (0.051) (0.031) (0.030) 
       
Export ratio 0.057 0.071* 0.037 0.047 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.030) (0.030) 
       
Employment  0.0032 -0.0040 0.0109** 0.0080 
Protection (0.0081) (0.0077) (0.0055) (0.0056) 
       
Union Density 0.002 -0.011 -0.042** -0.049*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.018) (0.018) 
       
Product Market   0.0039**  0.0022** 
Regulation  (0.0018)  (0.0010) 
       
Market  0.0039** 0.0064*** 0.0020* 0.0034*** 
Capitalization (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
       
Inflation -0.078*** -0.069*** -0.064*** -0.058*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) 
       
Output gap 0.131*** 0.115*** 0.061** 0.053** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.026) (0.025) 
       
Sector cycle -0.039*** -0.036** -0.059*** -0.056*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) 
     
Sargan-Hansen 
test 
 
265.4 (276) 
0.67 
 
264.31 (276) 
0.69 
 
260.9 (276) 
0.73 
 
261.3 (276) 
0.73 
 
m1 -6.59 (0.00) -6.52 (0.00) 1.11 (0.27) 0.62 (0.53) 
m2 0.94 (0.35) 0.93 (0.35) 2.03 (0.04) 1.85 (0.06) 
     
Nb Obs 6105 6105 6105 6105 
     
 
Long-term sensitivity 
 
IMPRATIO -0.52 -0.41 -0.43 -0.36 
EXPRATIO 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.16 
EP 0.007 -0.009 0.036 0.026 
UDNET 0.00 -0.02 -0.14 -0.16 
PMR  0.007  0.009 
LOGCAPIT 0.009 0.014 0.007 0.011 
DEFL -0.18 -0.16 -0.21 -0.19 
GAP 0.30 0.26 0.20 0.17 
EMPCYC -0.09 -0.08 -0.19 -0.19 
 
Notes. 
The first and third columns repeat estimates reported in Table 5. The second and fourth columns add the Product Market 
Regulation index as an explanatory variable, respectively. 
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Table 7: Determinants of the Price-Cost Margin 
 
 Robustness Checks: Further lags for trade instruments 
 
 
Further lags for trade 
instruments 
 GMMb 
GMM- 
ORTH 
   
Lag (PCM) 0.555*** 0.708*** 
 (0.057) (0.037) 
    
Import ratio -0.183*** -0.081*** 
 (0.045) (0.031) 
    
Export ratio 0.017 0.012 
 (0.040) (0.027) 
    
Employment  0.0029 0.0088* 
Protection (0.0079) (0.0052) 
    
Union Density 0.034 -0.037** 
 (0.034) (0.017) 
    
Market  0.0043*** 0.0015 
Capitalization (0.0015) (0.0010) 
    
Inflation -0.068*** -0.057*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) 
    
Output gap 0.099*** 0.039* 
 (0.037) (0.024) 
    
Sector cycle -0.035** -0.053*** 
 (0.014) (0.009) 
   
Sargan-Hansen 
test 
 
262.4 (270) 
0.62 
 
257.0 (270) 
0.71 
 
m1 -6.82 (0.00) -0.21 (0.83) 
m2 0.90 (0.37) 1.48 (0.14) 
   
Nb Obs 6105 6105 
   
 
Long-term sensitivity 
 
IMPRATIO -0.41 -0.28 
EXPRATIO 0.04 0.04 
EP 0.007 0.030 
UDNET 0.01 -0.13 
LOGCAPIT 0.010 0.005 
DEFL -0.15 -0.20 
GAP 0.22 0.13 
EMPCYC -0.08 -0.18 
 
 
Notes. 
The same notes as Table 5 apply except that for the first two columns, lags 3 to 5 of the trade variables are used as 
instruments instead of lags 2 to 4. 
 
 35 
 
 
 
Table 8: Impact of the tremendous changes 
in OECD economies on the Price-Cost Margin overall  
 
 
 
Changes in the explanatory variables over the period 
 
 
Import ratio 
 
Export ratio Employment 
Protection 
Union 
Density 
 
Product 
Market 
Regulation 
Stock Market 
Capitalizat. 
GDP 
Deflator 
Change 
 
Australia 0.15 0.06 0.00 -0.08 -3.19 1.86 -0.037 
Austria 0.16 0.18 0.65 -0.16 -1.92 1.80 -0.022 
Belgium 0.19 0.21 -0.18 0.12 -2.62 1.63 -0.028 
Canada 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.07 -1.67 2.65 -0.009 
Denmark 0.09 0.19 -0.28 0.17 -2.84 1.90 -0.068 
Spain 0.19 0.13 -0.36 0.09 -1.48 3.41 -0.165 
Finland 0.02 0.15 -0.12 0.28 -3.35 2.82 -0.017 
France 0.15 0.15 0.70 -0.12 -2.20 2.64 -0.038 
UK 0.21 0.13 0.11 -0.13 -3.39 1.45 -0.054 
Germany 0.04 0.11 -0.12 -0.05 -1.77 0.94 -0.003 
Italy 0.10 0.11 -0.22 0.02 -1.56 1.94 -0.045 
Japan 0.07 0.09 0.00 -0.08 -2.50 0.26 -0.079 
Netherlands 0.14 0.23 -0.12 -0.12 -2.22 1.10 -0.030 
Norway  0.05 0.06 -0.16 0.05 -2.25 1.86 -0.104 
New Zealand 0.10 0.07 0.00 -0.11 -3.74 1.95 -0.108 
Sweden 0.07 0.18 0.96 0.23 -2.57 3.18 -0.005 
USA 0.15 0.08 0.00 -0.12 -2.71 1.14 -0.030 
        
Average change 0.119 0.133 0.051 0.003 -2.47 1.91 -0.050 
 
Average of absolute 
change 0.119 0.133 0.235 0.118 2.47 1.91 0.050 
 
 
 
 
Impact of these changes on the PCM across countries(*) 
 
Minimum -0.073 0.009 -0.009 -0.045 -0.027 0.003 0.001 
Maximum -0.007 0.036 0.025 0.026 -0.010 0.038 0.032 
 
Average of absolute 
effect 0.042 0.021 0.006 0.019 0.017 0.021 0.010 
 
 
(*): To assess the impact of each determinant, the changes reported in the upper part of the table are applied to GMM1-ORTH 
estimates of Table 6. 
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Figure 1: Price-Cost Margin and Import penetration ratio at manufacturing level 
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